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ARGUMENT

In the Brief of Cross-Appellee and Reply Brief of Appellant ("Cross-

Appellee's Brief), Hess argues that his complaint in this case against Johnston
complied with the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 11: "Mr. Hess' claims are
warranted under existing law, or, at the very least, by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of

new law." Cross-Appellee's Brief at 2-3. Although Hess concedes that Jackson
v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 1995) abolished any cause of action for

breach of a promise to marry, he argues: "The Court in Jackson however, did not

abolish all possible causes of actions arising from a cancelled engagement."
Cross-Appellee's Brief at 5. Hess points to dicta in Jackson that was not adopted
by the majority to support his argument. Cross-Appellee's Brief, at 5.
What Hess did in his complaint, however, was to assert the very type of

claim that was clearly and explicitly abolished in Jackson, not any type of claim
that even the dicta in Jackson suggests might exist. By asserting that type of

claim, regardless of what he calls it, Hess engaged in the very conduct this Court
sought to prevent in Jackson: "!,[l]f we were to uphold the action, any time an
engaged party were to cancel wedding plans for any reason, the other party

would have a prima facie case for breach of promise to marry." Id., 904 P.2d at
687. "Such an action would be highly susceptible to abuse by persons whose

feelings are damaged by a former fiancee's decision to cancel a wedding. In

Norton, we held that actions so manipulate and vulnerable to this type of abuse

are 'counterproductive' to the good of the state." Id. The instant action
represents just such an abusive effort, by a jilted boyfriend. Indeed, the
complaint contains no allegation of any expense incurred in wedding
preparations.

Hess' argument to justify the filing of this action hinges on his assertion
that, because an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim survived the

abolition of breach of promise in Jackson, that he was objectively justified in

arguing for the claims he asserted, either as existing law or reasonable
extensions of existing law. Cross-Appellant's Brief at 6. This argument holds no

water, however, because damaged feelings may well result from a canceled

wedding, as Jackson points out, ibid., but there is no claim. Id. The separate tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires "outrageous and intolerable

conduct" that "offend[s] against the generally accepted standards of decency and
morality." Id. at 687-38. Accepting gifts during courtship, which is all the
complaint pleads, could not reasonably be construed to be outrageous or

intolerable or against the standards of society.
In contrast, the Jackson complaint alleged fraudulent misrepresentations

that were made to induce the plaintiff to enter into a romantic relationship in the

first instance and then to proceed toward engagement. Id., 904 P.2d at 688. The
gravamen of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was defendant's

allegedly extreme and outrageous conduct of lying about being unmarried, and
therefore available for marriage, then carrying on a romantic relationship under
that false pretense until only hours before a scheduled wedding. It is that conduct

- fraudulently inducing and continuing an intimate relationship until such a
dramatic and emotional moment - that might have been found to be extreme and

outrageous conduct, not the breach of an unenforceable promise to marry. See
id. The elements of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in

Jackson were plainly independent of the breach of promise that occurred and

L

Jackson thus plainly held there could be no claim for breach of promise.
No such facts exist in this case, in which, as was pointed out in the Cross-

Appellant's Opening Brief, there are no allegations of fraud. Even if the dicta

concerning economic expenditures could be extended to gifts, the complaint does
not plead a single wedding-related expense that could be sustainable under a
conditional gift theory.

In the light of the plain language of Jackson, especially about avoiding

potential abuse and the utter absence of any fraud allegations or wedding
expense allegations, all that Hess seeks is recovery of courtship expenses and
his hurt feelings do not justify the making of such a legally-abolished claim. Hess'
assertion that his error as to the existence of a cause of action was reasonable,

even if wrong, cannot pass an objective review of the law and the pleaded facts.

Conclusion

Rule 11 sanctions should be awarded against Hess and Johnston should

recover her reasonable attorneys fees, costs and expenses incurred in defending
against this action, which was brought without any legally or factually sustainable
basis. Courtship expenses are not recoverable for simple breach of promise.
Respectfully Submitted this 26th day of January, 2007.
Peters Scofield Price
A Professional Corporation
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